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Principles of Cosmopolitan Democracy

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Cosmopolitan democracy is an ambitious project whose aim is to achieve a world order based on the rule of law and democracy. Politicians and diplomats, along with many students of political theory and international relations, tend to disregard such ideas. They are, they say, as noble as they are inconclusive. These sceptics do not deny that the desire to apply these values to international relations is valid in principle. But they do point out that there are other factors which really count in relations among states, such as the political clout of nations, the self-interest of governments, and unfathomable (often even for the proponents themselves) geopolitical interests. According to this argument, any effort which overlooks these hard facts is doomed for failure - sheer utopia, the stuff of dreamers oblivious of how world politics really works.

Yet this surfeit of realism underestimates the role projects play in defining the rules of political systems, world order included. Over the past few centuries, the global order has been inforn1ed by rules subscribed to by the leading players on the international stage. Although sometimes interpreted liberally, these rules set constraints on strategic decisions. The Peace of Westphalia (1648), the Peace of Utrecht (1712), the Congress of Vienna (1814), the Congress of Paris (1919), the Yalta Conference

(l944) and the Charter of San Francisco (1945) all defined an international order. On each occasion the wielders of world power subscribed to rules which they were prepared to abide by - albeit only in part. Yet all these events were, directly or indirectly, influenced by thinkers who, often centuries in advance, had elaborated doctrines, laws or even projects and statutes which created bodies of opinion and influenced the politicians sitting at the negotiating tables.

The history of how utopian ideas influenced world politics has yet to be written. We do know, however, that the writings of Hugo Grotius and Émeric Crucé informed some of the ideas approved at Westphalia; that Saint-Pierre was physically at the gates of Utrecht; that President Wilson was acquainted with the peace projects of William Penn and William Ladd; and that Hans Kelsen prepared and circulated drafts for a new League of Nations statute long before governments agreed on the founding of the United Nations. Arguably more important was the role that these ideas played in spreading the belief that international life did not necessarily have to be a theatre for all-out war; it could also encompass institutional cooperation and generate political and social peacemaking movements.

There is general agreement that we are now experiencing the transition from one international system to another. We are well acquainted with the characteristics of the order we are leaving behind the Cold War[1] - but the shape of the coming world order has still to be defined. The factors which will regulate the international system will depend, as in the past, on the balance of power between political actors. But this balance will also be determined by our ability to identify the objectives and strategies around which we intend to mobilize the forces at our disposal and over which different interests may clash.

Under the banner 'cosmopolitan democracy', we intend to build a political project for a different world order.[2] This chapter reasserts and outlines the main points on this agenda.

FOUR PREMISES FOR DEMOCRACY

The political project presented here is strongly linked to the concept of democracy. But what do we mean by 'democracy'? Defining the word is no easy matter, not least because of the virtually universal favour democracy enjoys today. However we look at it, theoretically and practically, democracy exists in a variety of substantially different systems.[3] In this chapter, I will apply the rather wide definition provided by David Beetham:

> Democracy I take to be a mode of decision-making about collectively binding rules and policies over which the people exercise control, and the most democratic arrangement to be that where all members of the collectivity enjoy effective equal rights to take part in such decision-making directly.[4]

It is not the intention of this chapter to enter into the debate on the nature of democracy. Rather, I wish to point out that, so far, democracy has mainly been applied to the management of power within states. In order to extend democracy beyond the borders of individual political communities, four premises are required.

(I) *Democracy is an unfinished journey* The journey towards democracy has not been completed in any country,[5] including those in which the principles of democracy are most consolidated and developed. In both democratic and autocratic states, there are struggles, admittedly of a very different nature, to extend or to obtain democracy.

(2) *Democracy is an endless journey* Democracy is much more than just a set of norms and procedures. It ought, indeed, to be viewed as a fully fledged process of interaction between civil society and political institutions. In this sense, it may be more appropriate to speak not so much about plain democracy as about the *democratic route*,[6] that is, a progressive evolution of political systems to meet individuals' demands for participation. We can identify a number of milestones along the democratic route: among them, the majority principle, universal suffrage, minority rights, etc. Individual polities have met none or some of these milestones in different historical situations and not necessarily in the same order. As a journey, the democratic process is not only unfinished but also endless.

(3) *Democracy has a meaning in its historical context* Since the democratic process is a historical one, the very notion of democracy needs to be viewed comparatively not absolutely. Ancient Athens was democratic compared to other city-states in the fourth century BC, yet it fails to meet most of the criteria commonly applied today. Its lack of suffrage for the vast majority of the population would make it a system very similar to the South Africa of apartheid. In the nineteenth century, Great Britain and the United States were exceptionally democratic nations, yet they barred the majority of their respective populations, women included, from voting. This is a crucial point for understanding the evolution of democracy at the international level: there will never be a point in history when all states will share the same procedures and values for the management of power. Even if all states embrace democracy, each will be characterized by its unique features and stage of development. The idea of a global democracy should therefore be based on the acceptance of a variety of models and stages.

(4) *Democracy needs an endogenous fabric to work* The democratic route is an integral part and parcel of social dynamics and, as such, flows out of the day-to-day political struggle. Democracy is a conquest and, like all conquests, is the outcome of conflict. To be substantial and effective, the greatest part of the struggle for democracy should be based an endogenous rather than exogenous, forces. This suggests

that democracy is achieved in a bottom-up manner and when the internal conditions are suitable to allow it to function. Even when democratic principles were imposed by external forces, as with Germany, Italy, Japan and other countries after the Second World War, they took hold only because the reconstruction of the social fabric within these countries ensured the acceptance of such principles.

The concept of cosmopolitan democracy outlined in this chapter heavily relies on these four premises. These premises will be applied `to develop a process whereby independent but interdependent communities should search their own route to improve their political institutions.

HAS DEMOCRACY WON?

At the dawn of the twenty-first century, democracy is, of all political models, the undisputed winner. It was a moving experience in the 1980s and early 1990s to see millions of people forming orderly queues, sometimes for hours or even days, to take part in the 'holiest' rite of democracy - free elections. All over the world, from Chile and Nicaragua to Czechoslovakia, Russia and Poland as far as the Philippines, South Africa and many other countries still, citizens were at last allowed to exercise their right to choose their own rulers. Although the procedural aspects of democracy have not always (yet?) been matched to substantive outcomes,[7] it is significant that so many governments have decided to seek legitimacy in free elections.

In the academic community, the victory of democracy dates even further back - and has been even more overwhelming; these days, in fact, only a handful of dyed-in-the-wool conservatives are still prepared to come out explicitly against democracy. But what is the true essence of the model's victory? More important still, how much of it is rhetoric and how much is substance? It is possible to view democracy's triumphal march according to two parallel parameters:

- Geographical extension, or 'widening': how many countries are governed according to what we can refer to as democratic principles?
- Qualitative development, or 'deepening': what level of participation has been achieved in political communities inspired by democratic principles.

Although the geographical extension and qualitative development of a political system in the long run generally proceed in the same direction, in the short and medium terms they may diverge. Between the two world wars, for example, many European countries broadened the suffrage, extending it to the poor and to women, and introduced given economic and social rights for the first time. In other countries still – Italy, Germany and Spain for example - liberal political regimes were overthrown by fascist ones.

Europe thus experienced qualitative development on the one hand, and a slowdown in geographical extension on the other.

The number of democratic countries has notably increased over the last two centuries. While at the end of the eighteenth century, democratic principles were applied only in Swiss cantons, France and the United States, today there are as many as 107 democratic countries around the world.[8] They include several countries which have become democratic only recently. This new wave[9] encompasses both states which have returned to democracy after some form of interruption (especially in Europe), and states which are embracing a democratic system for the first time.

So much for the geographical extension of democracy, but what of quality? It does not seem that the new wave has yet fostered qualitative improvements in countries that were democratic in the first place. Economic rights have been eroded, while those of ethnic minorities remain undefined. In addition, achievements during the 1960s and 1970s such as the welfare state have been savagely undermined by the governments concerned. In many countries, the state's ability to hold together the various components of civil society is being tested. In some democratic states, such as Canada, Spain, Italy, Australia and Belgium, sharp conflicts have emerged among different ethnic groups, jeopardizing the very idea of national unity. In other states, such as the former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, the process of transition towards democracy has brought with it divisions between ethnic groups and the reemergence of bloody civil wars.

The wave of democratization has in no way heralded the 'end of history' hoped for by the most optimistic observers (or perhaps those least conscious of the cyclical nature of history). The idea that the collapse of a wall - even if it happened to be the Berlin Wall - could bring history to an end was based on the basic misconception of democracy as a set of rules and procedures to which all states adhere rather than as a route, and as a static as opposed to an essentially dynamic phenomenon. It is not surprising, therefore, that while the end of the Cold War has cleared the path towards democracy, it has also caused new problems for which politicians and scholars were entirely unprepared.

We hear again predictions on the future of democracy, and they are by no means unanimous. Some observers maintain that all states will ultimately embrace this political credo, and go as far as to say that in the space of about a century virtually all countries will become democratic.[10] Others counter that the conditions which allowed the emergence of democracy do not exist in many parts of the world, and that it is thus unlikely to extend any further.[11] Democracy, it has been argued, is a Western-specific cultural value and there is little point in attempting to extend it outside its native cradle.

The conception of democracy outlined in the previous section suggests different answers. The struggle for democracy which has mobilized so many Western and non-Western populations does indicate that democracy has become a universal aspiration. It is striking that many Western scholars and politicians who strongly support their own democratic systems would deny other populations the right to be ruled according to the same principles.[12] Democracy has not become a universal principle of political conduct through the textbooks of a few scholars, but rather because an increasing number of populations aspire to it.

Moreover, the claim that democracy can be applied only within Western societies ignores the fundamental problems that these very countries are experiencing` in defending and extending this system.[13] One of the problems is that it is increasingly difficult to be internally democratic in an increasingly interdependent world. What then are the hurdles to the democratic process raised by international factors? The next section attempts to answer this question.

DOMESTIC DEMOCRACY AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

The international system influences domestic political life in many ways. In developing the arguments of cosmopolitan democracy, it is important to stress two types of influence: (1) those stemming from international conflict, and (2) those stemming from processes of economic, social and cultural globalization.

International conflict

Sharp international conflict hinders the attainment and development of democracy within states. Historically, the most significant example of the phenomenon is also the most recent: the Cold War, creating an incessant external danger that strongly limited political freedom within states. Democratic states felt almost besieged. In a world in which the majority of states were autocratic,-many deemed it impossible to apply all the norms of domestic democracy. This lack of democracy was evident mainly in those policies most directly linked to the international framework: foreign and defence policies. These were often removed from the control of public opinion and dominated by oligarchic power groups which de facto deprived citizens of external sovereignty.

In addition, external threats were used to prevent any opposition to the established authorities, the assumption being that internal criticism would weaken the country's position. This was true - albeit at different levels of intensity - in both democratic and autocratic countries. Mary Kaldor has shown that the reasons underpinning the rivalry between the

United States and the Soviet Union were largely internal.[14] Although taking different shapes, external threats were used in both blocs for political ends: in the East to thwart the advent of democracy, in the West to prevent its development.

The conflict between the two blocs further limited the number of sovereign states. Only a handful of them, those equipped with nuclear arms, were de facto sovereign. The others were forced to accept interference in their domestic affairs and limitations on their own sovereignty. Interference took various forms, ranging from full-scale military invasion (the Soviet invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, for example), to hostile interventions leading to the overthrow of regimes (CIA activities to topple the Allende government in Chile), to intrusions to prevent hostile parties from having access to government (the US de facto veto on the entry of Communist parties into the governments of various European countries). The dominant powers installed puppet regimes whose only merit was that they were loyal. In Indo-China, the Middle East and Africa the rivalry between the two blocs often overflowed into armed conflicts fought by third parties. The lack of external sovereignty thus ultimately compromises internal sovereignty.

The Cold War set precise limits on the endogenous development of democracy, making it possible only when compatible with global scenarios. Although the Cold War was a specific international regime and now belongs to the past, it laid bare a problem of much wider proportions: namely that domestic democracy cannot fully mature in a world marked by conflict. The project of cosmopolitan democracy should the re fore be based on the control of international violence .

Globalization

The sovereignty of states has not been limited exclusively by a fiercely competitive international regime. It has also been eroded by the spontaneous but even more tenacious process of economic, political, social and cultural globalization. New information and communication technologies have made the various national communities increasingly interdependent. Structural changes have also implied substantial changes in the process of political decision-making: few decisions made in one state are autonomous from those made in others. A decision on the interest rate in Germany has significant consequences for employment in Greece, Portugal and Italy. A state's decision to use nuclear energy has environmental consequences for the citizens of neighbouring countries. Immigration policies in the European Union have a significant impact on the economic development of Mediterranean Africa. All this happens without the affected citizens having a say in the matter.[15]

It is difficult today to conceive of a political decision being taken in one state without its having consequences for others. Likewise, every aspect of a state's economic, social and political life is affected by political decisions taken in others. The idea that the citizens of a given community may autonomously determine their own destiny is thus an illusory one in a world increasingly characterized by interdependence.

The two points raised above lead to the following conclusion: either we accept that democratic systems are largely incomplete due to the lack of a congenial world order[16] or we attempt to extend democracy to international life as well. This means, on the one hand, ensuring a peaceful, non-violent international system and, on the other, developing methods of civilized coexistence to allow communities to democratically address problems that also involve others. The next section asks whether this option is desirable, and whether it is feasible.

IS A DEMOCRACY AMONG STATES POSSIBLE?

Although democracy is universally acknowledged today as the best system possible for the governance of states,[17] not everyone is prepared to address the question of global democracy. Some believe that such a scheme is impossible, others that it is undesirable, while still others feel it is a problem of the domestic life of states.

The critique of realist theoreticians

The realists posit that the main driving force of international politics is national interest It is highly unlikely that a government will give priority to global rather than national interests. Greater coordination among states is possible only when there are explicit advantages, and when no one state can benefit from a situation of conflict. Whenever these conditions have existed, they have given rise to specific international regimes. Otherwise, it is impossible to achieve the climate of cooperation among states which is *a sine qua non* for a world order founded on the values of democracy. To overload the international system with expectations it is incapable of meeting is, the realists argue, counterproductive. Moreover, it would be wrong to assume that the internal political regime of a state has any influence on its foreign policy: 'A realist theory of international politics' stated Hans Morgenthau, the most articulate of its advocates, 'will also avoid the popular fallacy of equating the foreign policies of a statesman with his philosophic or political sympathies, and of deducing the former from the latter.'[18]

To maintain a world order it is also necessary to reduce the number of political actors. If the parties to the main strategic choices increase in number - as the democratization project implies - the resulting complexity would risk becoming ungovernable. The consequence might be world disorder, not order, and the number of conflicts may increase rather than decrease. Some realists have related the upheavals of the 1990s to the end of the superpower-dominated world order. For them the Cold War system was imperfect, but it did keep in check forces that were later to prove ungovernable.

Realists are right to stress the importance of national interests in determining political choices, especially international choices. But they also tend to underestimate the development of interests with global scope. The fact is that commerce, tourism, cultural and social exchanges and many other activities mobilize massive interests which rely on an international arena based on cooperation. It is therefore likely that these interests will lead to greater coordination in world politics; this already happened a few centuries ago when the enlargement of economic and social areas led to the making of nation-states. The growth in the number and role of international governmental and non-governmental organizations and other 'control mechanisms' is proof that such interests have already achieved significant results.[19]

There is, of course, no guarantee that greater coordination in world politics will be informed by the values of democracy. Democracy continues to be a contestable principle. The question which should therefore be posed to realist theoreticians is the following: should 'control mechanisms' in world politics be informed by the principles of democracy?

The objections of communitarians

Some argue that the very concept of democracy can only be applied within communities which are relatively homogeneous from a cultural point of view. Danilo Zolo, for example, warns that democracy cannot be exported.[20] Democracy requires the formation of a majority which must govern in the interest of the whole population. In excessively heterogeneous communities, it would be impossible to form a majority homogeneous enough to allow the formation of a government. And such a government would have to struggle to represent the very different minorities. Multi-ethnic states have proved too vast to be governed democratically without minorities perceiving the rules of the majority as unacceptable. Such difficulties confirm the problems involved in the working of democracy on too large a scale.

It may be possible to force the populations into a cultural and social relationship which would allow the formation of a socially and culturally homogeneous world community. According to communitarians, though, any gains in terms of democracy would be losses in terms of

diversity, one of humanity's most precious assets and most worth preserving. Far from denying that the international system hinders the full development of democracy inside states (sometimes considerably), communitarians believe that we must be prepared to accept the fact and do what we can to allow states to override the ensuing constraints. Their standpoint is that international democracy is not desirable.

Communitarian theoreticians seem to underestimate the negative implications which the absence of international democracy implies for democracy inside single communities. Nonetheless, as we shall see below, the cosmopolitan democracy project sets great store by the communitarian suggestion that it is necessary to imagine a world order flexible enough to both meet the needs of different peoples and protect the political, social and cultural rights of minorities.[21]

Communitarians are right to point out, after Rousseau, that democracy works better on a small scale. But exactly what this scale should be is impossible to determine in advance. While Plato and Rousseau believed that it could not be greater than a city-state, today it has become possible in vast, diverse regions such as the United States. The European Union is inventing new constitutional forms. To date, the evolution of democracy has depended, at least in part, on the scale of the communities it has had to administer. Hence the progression from direct democracy (applicable on a small scale) to representative democracy. The open question is: which form of democracy should be applied on a global scale ?

Reducing international democracy to a domestic problem

There is, finally, a third school of thought which, unlike the first two, believes that international democracy is both possible and desirable. But it adds the proviso that the attainment of such a democracy is not so much a problem of the international system as of single states. If all states were to become democratic, the international system would necessarily tend towards greater democracy. Bobbio formulates this hypothesis in the questions 'Is an international democratic system possible among solely autocratic states?' and, alternatively, 'Is an international autocratic system possible among solely democratic states?', concluding that 'the negative answer is automatic in both cases.'[22]

Working to achieve international democracy thus means, first of all, transforming autocratic states into democratic ones. If the entire international community were made up of democratic states, the world order would be informed by democratic values. Attaining international democracy is, therefore, not impossible hut possibly pointless in so far as it would be the natural outcome of internal democracy.[23]

It is, in my view, simplistic to believe that the democratization of international relations would evolve exclusively as a result of states' domestic regimes. It is, first and foremost, difficult to establish a causal nexus between domestic regimes and the international system. Bobbio states that 'the vicious circle may be formulated as follows: states can become democratic only in a fully democratized international society, but a fully democratized international society presupposes that all states that compose it are democratic.'[24] If the existence of authoritarian regimes is a stumbling-block for the fully democratic regulation of international relations, it follows that a sharply hierarchical international system - like the one which prevailed throughout the Cold War - is, in turn, an obstacle to the development of democracy within nations.

We have seen how this international system has prevented democracy not only in areas dominated by authoritarian countries (the countries of Soviet Union-controlled Eastern Europe), but also in those dominated by democratic countries (Latin America? South Africa and states of southern Asia under the wing of the United States). We have also seen foreign policies which are 'incoherent'[25] with the conduct which inspires political systems inside countries. Authoritarian countries have often used cynical and brutal methods in foreign policy too: we might almost say that it is what we have come to expect. The Soviet Union, for example, used violence to defend its control over its satellite states - as the invasions of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan demonstrate. On other occasions, it acted 'incoherently' in supporting the process of decolonization or opposing the apartheid system in South Africa with greater firmness than many democratic countries.

The same 'incoherences' can be seen in democratic countries. In certain cases, they have effectively promoted the export of their own political system; after the Second World War the United States played a fundamental role in restoring democracy in Europe and introducing it for the first time in Japan. On other occasions, it was responsible for brutal displays of force contrary to international law, as with the invasions of Vietnam, Grenada and Panama. Elsewhere, democratic countries have perpetrated hostile actions - albeit not necessarily direct military intervention - against democratic countries, as in the case of US actions against Chile and Nicaragua.[26]

These facts confirm that there need be no correspondence between the nature of a country's domestic system and the actions it adopts in its foreign policy. As the realist school of international relations suggests, a nation's domestic political system is not wholly binding on its foreign policy.

ln all likelihood, some of the unlawful actions of foreign policy carried out hy democratic states may have depended on the fact that such states found themselves pitted against autocratic states. This takes us to a third question posed by Bobbio: 'Is it possible to he fully democratic in a non democratic world?'[27]

However much a conflictual international system has distorted the conduct of democratic states, it cannot be seen as the only reason for that conduct. It would be disingenuous to deny that whenever interests and principles have clashed, democracies have often opted for the first and forgotten the second.

THE AIMS OF COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY

The relationship between democracy and international relations is not linear but ambivalent. Internal democracy helps but does not determine the rise of a democratic world order, just as a democratic international system would not necessarily generate democracy in all states. This suggests that to develop democracy further, it is necessary to operate on different complementary and self-sustaining levels. Cosmopolitan democracy is a project to build a world order capable of promoting democracy on three different but mutually supporting levels: (1) democracy inside nations; (2) democracy among states; (3) global democracy.[28]

In the cosmopolitan project, the notion of democracy may be applied differently in each of the three levels. Democratic procedures and norms need to be tailored according to the issues concerned: for example, what are the appropriate constituencies to settle problems involving two local communities of separate states but located on opposite sides of the same river, for problems involving regional settlements, or for problems of global concern? Quite clearly, the forum will be different in each of these cases.

Democracy inside nations

lt is good news that democracy is emerging as a universal aspiration. An increasing amount of evidence shows that formal democracy is correlated to several substantive measures of welfare, ranging from environmental protection to economic development.[29] Although the causality is still uncertain, this evidence indicates that peoples' claim to he ruled according to democratic principles is based on sound expectations.

The cosmopolitan project, however, should not prescribe identical procedures in each national community. This is an issue which should he addressed by national communities and not by the international system; the norms, procedures and structure of democracy will he very different in Western, Asian or African societies. The concept of democracy outlined above suggests that this must be a basically endogenous as opposed to exogenous phenomenon. Robespierre warned against the mania of making peoples happy against their will. Paraphrasing him, it is necessary to adopt the same

caution in making peoples democratic against their wishes. Empirical studies[30] show that three-quarters of democratic countries have become so due to internal rather than external forces. This confirms that we cannot do without endogenous development.

This does not mean that the world- order has no influence on the development of national democracies. The main contribution that the world order can provide in support of internal democracy is to remove obstacles by providing peaceful international relations (see the discussion on pp. 203-4 above). For the development of democracy inside nations would be greatly helped by a favourable external environment. In many cases, obstacles to democratization come from internal forces, as in the case of authoritarian regimes which stay in power by repressing their citizens. This also happens to be one of the most problematic situations to address, since action may entail undue interference in a state's affairs, and inaction may entail connivance with its tyrannous government. A consensus is now emerging on the right to democracy and to elected government.[31] The shaping of an international legal framework is certainly a major support to the internal forces pressing to achieve democratization. But which methods should the international community use to 'interfere' in favour of democratization?

The traditional solution, namely military intervention promoted and managed by other governments, is unsatisfactory since in the majority of cases they pursue their own interests rather than the restoration of democracy. One of the aims of cosmopolitan democracy is therefore to identify alternative means of interference to the traditional ones. These include, on the one hand, the creation of new legitimate non-governmental authorities charged with pushing for democracy; and, on the other hand , the identification of new methods which minimize the use of violence.

In recent years, new forms of intervention have been tried. They include assistance from international organizations to organize, monitor and certify elections; enhanced diplomatic actions; economic and other sanctions; conditionality on economic aid; conditionality for participation in regional organizations such as the European Union, etc. The pressure of the international community on national governments has been helpful and many governments declare themselves democratic even if some basic principles of democracy, such as minority rights or freedom of expression, are not actually enforced.[32] This leads to the urgency that democratic procedures should somehow be assessed by external agents, as has already happened with electoral assistance. The role played by non-governmental organizations could be further expanded.

Democracy among states

Democracy among states must be seen as respect for reciprocal sovereignty and as a set of norms

commonly shared and subscribed to by states. The juridical and largely formal norm of sovereignty should therefore be defended and enforced in cases of one state's interference in the domestic affairs of others. Sovereignty should however be matched to norms which states - unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally - are prepared to respect. The basic representative criterion in the interstate system should be based on the criterion of 'one state, one vote'.[33]

Democracy among states also implies strengthening ties between states by developing intergovernmental institutions to deal with specific regional and global problems. This may allow the creation of subjectspecific institutions where the states more directly involved in selected issues have a greater weight. A large number of UN specialized agencies have already applied similar criteria. Similarly, interstate democracy is an area where the 'functional approach' to international organizations is more pertinent.[34] The more competences and functions are absorbed by problem-driven intergovernmental organizations, the less significance is left to the juridical state's external and/or internal sovereignty.

We speak of democracy among states, but states have often been defined arbitrarily. Examples abound of stateless peoples and of multiethnic states. In the event of a strong claim for the formation of a new state, it is necessary to find methods to achieve this without recourse to violence.

Global democracy

There are some problems, such as the environment question and, more generally, all problems concerning security and world survival, which transcend the authority of national governments. These problems can be named 'global' since they cannot be addressed effectively by intergovernmental bodies. Different forms of representation are made necessary by the fact that many of the governments concerned are authoritarian governments whose positions are often different from those of their populations.

Even in democratic countries, national public opinion is not generally consulted on such specific issues and notable differences might emerge between the positions of governments and those of civil society. For example, the French public probably took a different view from that of its government over nuclear experiments in the Pacific. In other cases, the choices of a people, even when made democratically, might be biased by self-interest. It may, for example, be in the interest of the French public to obtain cheap nuclear energy if they manage to dispose of radioactive waste in a Pacific isle under their control, but this will obviously be against the interests of the public living there.

If some global questions are to he handled according to democratic criteria, there must he political representation for citizens in global affairs, independently and autonomously of their political representation

in domestic affairs. The unit should be the individual, although the mechanisms for participation and representation may vary according to the nature and scope of the issues discussed.

The discussion of the aims of cosmopolitan democracy shows that they can be served only by institutional arrangements which would link across and within the existing states. But which union of states can best serve the objectives stated? To answer that question, I will use as reference points the two principal models of existing state systems: confederations and federations,[35] describing them as ideal models which do not necessarily stem from specific historical experiences. My aim is to show the ways in which the cosmopolitan democracy model differs from both.

THE CONFEDERAL MODEL

A confederation is an association of sovereign states which, through an appropriate treaty, reach an agreement on given issues. Some confederations have arisen as coalitions pitted against states or unions of rival states; as such, their function has been essentially military. NATO and the Warsaw Pact belong to this category. Other confederations are virtually open to all the states in the world. They include organizations with very restricted aims, such as the Universal Postal Union and the World Intellectual Property Organization. But the confederations which are of most interest here are ones of universal scope whose main objective is to prevent war and guarantee peace. The prime example is one of the most ambitious, sophisticated confederations ever created - the UNO. The following is an analysis of the confederal model's capacity to fit the three levels of democracy presented in the last section.

Democracy inside nations

The confederal model may help indirectly to foster democratization to the extent that it overrides some of the hurdles which a conflict-ridden international system puts in the way of domestic political participation. It does not, however, envisage a channel of direct intervention to promote democracy within nations. The principle of non-interference prohibits the intervention of the confederation and its members in domestic affairs. Not even in blatant cases of violation of fundamental human rights - genocide, for example - is the confederation entitled to intervene in a state's domestic affairs. On the contrary, the very existence of mutual institutional acknowledgement between the governments of states might render external interventions for humanitarian reasons even more difficult.

The problem of domestic democracy thus remains totally removed from the international system.

Democracy among states

In the confederal model, sovereignty should guarantee that all states have autonomy and equal rights. Democracy is, nonetheless, limited by the fact that democratic and authoritarian governments enjoy the same rights. It is possible to imagine a world order in which decisions are taken democratically by the various governments, even though all the governments are authoritarian. For that matter, the joint forces of rulers might even be used to repress the claims of subjects in a given state. The Congress of Vienna came very close to this model.[36] It is not surprising, therefore, that from Rousseau onwards democratic thought has been extremely suspicious of peace projects such as that of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, which purported to set up a league of princes without questioning the domestic exertion of sovereignty.[37] Paradoxical as it may seem, democracy among states might end up being used as a tool for tyranny *within* nations.

Global democracy

Since the confederal model envisages no form of participation by individuals in international politics, any global decision choice is delegated to relations among states, represented by their governments. Global democracy is thus very limited and clearly defined.

It is important to stress that global democracy would be humbled in the confederal model, even if all of its members were to be democratic governments. The governments of states do not necessarily represent global interests. On the contrary, they tend to privilege the particular interests of their own political quarter. Inside the European Union, for examples the Council of Ministers, made up of the representatives of each of the national governments, is much less prepared to advocate 'European' solutions than a directly elected body such as the European Parliament.

The reason why the confederal model does not fit with global democracy resides in the fact that the civil societies in each of the states are separate from one another. They have no institutional channels to communicate through and have limited scope in so far as they are represented by national political parties on non-national questions.

THE FEDERALIST MODEL

The federalist model has a much more rigid constitutional structure than the confederal model. Its aim is to implement principles and norms valid for all members of the federal union. The model has been applied in a large number of contemporary states, including Switzerland, the United States
and Germany. These three states emerged as con federations , and have progressively centralized their powers to become constitution-based federal states. Other early confederations, such as the Netherlands, have developed into unitary states.

A distinguished intellectual and political tradition maintains that the problem of world peace and democracy can only be solved by setting firm limitations on the sovereignty of states, and by giving life to a process of centralizing power which would ultimately lead to a world federal state. This tradition maintains that the subdivision of the world into national states is a surmountable historical heritage. Not only may the fundamental values of democracy be shared by all human beings, but the institutions which protect them may also share some common basic principles and be under the same authority. Let us now see if this organizational model is capable of meeting the three levels of democracy highlighted above.

Democracy inside nations

If the federal state is founded on principles of democracy, it is paramount for these principles to be extended to its component members. In the event of essential conflicts, the federal government has the authority and coercive means to impose respect of democratic principles in component states. There are well-known examples in which different bodies of the federation have expressed different opinions on specific norms, and this has often given rise to conflict. In some cases, conflict has in turn triggered civil war. The most obvious example was the American War of Secession which ended with the restoration of the union and the application in all states of a constitutional norm - the abolition of slavery imposed by the federal government.

The concept of democracy I put forward here is one of internal conquest. It casts doubt on the idea that there is one model which is simultaneously applicable to all the regions of the world. The federal system presupposes the existence of a unity of norms among the various parties which is hard to reconcile with the world's cultural and anthropological differences. If we pay heed to communitarian arguments, this uniformity, albeit democratic, is undesirable among the world's communities.

Democracy among states

ln a narrow sense, democracy among states is abolished in a federal state in so far as sovereign states are abolished. Relations between central and local power are - as the history of existing federal states teaches regulated as conflicts of competences. The process of centralization which gave life to existing federal states shows, nonetheless, that the process which allowed different communities to accept a common sovereignty was the result of external conflict. The Swiss Confederation, the Dutch provinces and the United States were constituted in defence against attacks from other states. One wonders, therefore, whether the same experiment may be possible on a global scale where no external threats exist.

There is always the possibility that one party will gain control over the others through coercion, or, more precisely, that a sort of federal empire will arise. But if a means such as war is used to install this model, there is no reason to believe that, once it is operational, it will be inspired by the norms of democracy.

Global democracy

A central federal power would have the authority and competence to address global problems on the basis of democratic principles. It is, however, likely that some local problems would be dealt with to the detriment of the rights of component communities. A global government no matter how democratic, would be the expression of a heterogeneous majority, while the minorities not participating in government would be even more heterogeneous. A government of this kind would be constantly tempted to look for technocratic solutions to global problems. It would, in short, resemble the government of guardians dear to Plato more than a genuinely democratic one.

THE COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY MODEL

Is it possible to design a union of states midway between the confederal and the federalist models? Whereas the latter has acquired significant historical experience, cosmopolitan democracy has not. The few examples which have approached this third model have been the fruit of transitory experiences: confederations which during their transformation into federal states fleetingly assumed the essential characteristics of cosmopolitan democracy. Today this intermediate state can he seen in the European Union, already more than a simple confederation but not yet a federal system.

At present it is uncertain whether the European Union will assume the shape of a federation, or whether, instead, it will preserve its distinctive characteristics.

Partisans of the cosmopolitan model believe that it is undesirable to go beyond a given threshold of centralization on a scale as vast as a global one. Applied on a global scale, the cosmopolitan democracy model is not intended as a transitional step towards a federal system, but rather as a more permanent organization. On the other hand, the existing system of 'global governance' is not suitable for cosmopolitan democracy as it lacks sufficient legal competence, and its decision-making is not necessarily guided by the principles of democracy.[38]

The adjective 'cosmopolitan' is used in its eighteenth-century sense as a notion of citizenship both of the state and of the European *res publica*.[39] For Mary Kaldor,

the term cosmopolitan, when applied to political institutions, implies a layer of governance that constitutes a limitation on the sovereignty of states and yet does not itself constitute a state. In other words, a cosmopolitan institution would coexist with a system of states but would override states in certain clearly defined spheres of activity.[40]

I have preferred to refer to a 'cosmopolitan' democracy rather than an 'international' or 'supranational' one because the former may be confused with an exclusively intergovernmental organization and the latter may conjure up a hierarchical relationship between central institutions and individual states. The term 'transnational' comes closer to the project described here, although it does not necessarily refer to a concept of politics founded on citizenship. The term 'cosmopolitan', instead, manages to capture the dual reference to citizens of the world and of existing states.

Cosmopolitan democracy is therefore a project which aims to develop democracy within nations, among states and at the global level, assuming that the three levels, although highly interdependent, should and can be pursued simultaneously. It stresses that different democratic procedures are needed for each of these levels. Such a project proposes to integrate and limit the functions of existing states with new institutions based on world citizenship. These institutions should be entitled to manage issues of global concern as well as to interfere within states whenever serious violations of human rights are committed.

World citizenship does not necessarily have to assume all the demands of national citizenship. The real problem is to identify the areas in which citizens should have rights and duties as inhabitants of the world rather than of secular states. In some cases spheres of competence may overlap, in others they would be complementary.

The cosmopolitan system envisages not only the existence of universal human rights

protected by states, but also the creation of a mandatory core of rights which individuals may claim, as well as duties *vis-à-vis* global institutions. Rights ought to relate, in the first instance, to the sphere of survival and to issues which cross national boundaries. In relation to these rights, world citizens undersign certain duties which enable global institutions to perform a function of temporary replacement, subsidiarity and substitution vis-à-vis national institutions.

In the cosmopolitan model, the idea of sovereignty typical of the confederal and federal models is also profoundly changed. States, in fact, preserve their internal sovereignty vis-à-vis other states, but their sovereignty is eroded - including legally - by the transfer of functions to intergovernmental and non-governmental bodies. External sovereignty may also be eroded or, paraphrasing the young Kelsen, may become less 'dogmatic'.[41]

That internal and external sovereignty should be limited is an opinion shared by functionalism and by legal pacifism alike.[42] It is significant, however, that the two approaches diverge drastically when it comes to strategy. Functionalism champions a *de facto* erosion of sovereignty as a result of spontaneous processes, or at all events, without a general political design. On the other hand, legal pacifism aims basically for a *de jure* transfer of competences from government to supragovernmental authorities and to set up a unitary normative reference framework.

The two approaches have the same objective- the reduction of government authority - and they are thus highly complementary. In the cosmopolitan democracy project, however, the demands of both functionalism and legal pacifism are qualified. With respect to functionalism, the cosmopolitan model intends to accompany the spontaneous erosion of sovereignty with new forms of democratically legitimated political authority. With respect to legal pacifism, the cosmopolitan model does not necessarily intend to establish a single normative construction or a precise hierarchy of legal sources in which those at the national level are subordinated to those at the international level.[43]

The essential characteristics of the cosmopolitan model and its differences from the models presented earlier are discussed below. While the account of the confederal and federal models is mainly descriptive, that for the cosmopolitan model is prescriptive.

Democracy inside nations

Unlike the federal model, the cosmopolitan democracy model encompasses states with different political constitutions. This does not entail unquestioning acceptance of the dogma of non-interference, as is the case with the confederal model. On the contrary, the cosmopolitan model deliberately sets out to transmit and disseminate methods and tools of

government to various political communities, and hence to gradually make all-the member countries of the international community democratic. Nonetheless, the conception of democracy which underpins the cosmopolitan model suggests that differences between political systems will continue to exist in one form or another. Hence the need for international organizations which will allow this coexistence.

Since one state's intervention in the domestic affairs of another has no legal foundation and may be instrumental , the cosmopolitan model entrusts civil society as opposed to national governments with the task of 'interfering' in the domestic affairs of another state. The objective aim of this interference is to increase political participation in all states. The concept of democracy summarized in the four premises (pp. 199-201 above) suggests that all nations, albeit at very different stages in the democratic process, have something to gain by a critical analysis of their own political systems in relation to the experiences of others.

Democracy among states

Relations between states are managed by intergovernmental organizations. Multilateralism is the tool used to ensure non-interference and to prevent individual states from perpetrating acts which have harmful consequences for other members of the international community.

If the arbitration of intergovernmental institutions is not effective, disputes between states are passed on to international judicial institutions whose jurisdiction the states are compelled to accept. If a member of the international community refuses to obey the ruling of the judicial authority, the international community may adopt coercive measures, including economic, political and cultural sanctions. Military force is only the *extrema ratio* if all other political and diplomatic tools prove ineffective. The use of military force is controlled directly by the institutions of the union and must be *preventively* authorized in advance by the institutions of world citizens. States which participate in an armed conflict are dutybound to minimize the number of casualties on either side. The international community must also appeal to the citizens of the state which has violated international law to overthrow their government and replace it with one which abides by international law.

Global democracy

The management of essentially global issues such as the environment and the survival of humanity, including the rights of future generations, is delegated not only to intergovernmental institutions but also to transnational ones. Global civil society participates in political decisionmaking through new permanent institutions. These institutions may have

both specific competences (such as the environment, population issues, development, disarmament, etc.) and broader political mandates (such as the defence of fundamental rights, the protection of future generations, etc.). Some of these issues may be addressed on a regional basis through specially created organizations. Others are entrusted to established global institutions. These institutions would supplement but not replace existing intergovernmental organizations. Their function would be essentially advisory and not executive.

The institutions of global civil society would exercise direct control in one essential area: the prevention and impediment of acts of genocide or democide. To do so they would be entitled to demand the immediate intervention of the governments of all states. An international criminal court would also be set up to try individuals responsible for acts of genocide and democide, crimes against fundamental human rights, aggression against other states, and war crimes. The fact that jurisdiction is individual means that the responsibilities of a people may he separated from those of its rulers, and it is therefore possible to punish the wrongdoers.

THE VEHICLES OF COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY

This description of the cosmopolitan democracy model may appear somewhat puzzling. Even those convinced of the theoretical validity of the model put forward here will wonder how it is possible to achieve such a world order and how this conceptual model is related to the existing world order. Has such a model any direct implication for the real world? Has it something to say about everyday political behaviour? This section will stress some of the policy implications of the cosmopolitan democracy model which might be seen as normative prescriptions for international organizations, individual states and the nascent global civil society.

The European Union

The first international organization which begins to resemble the cosmopolitan model is the European Union. Its members are in fact sovereìgn states which have voluntarily transferred increasingly broad tasks (from coal and steel policy to human rights) to the Union. Furthermore Europe has displayed a notable centripetal force. Only six states originally signed the Treaty of Rome, t ut the number of EU members has now increased to fifteen (plus Enst Germany). Tlle centripetal force of the European Union is even greater than that of the United States, which has extended geographically without absorbing culturally heterogeneous communities.

From the constitutional point of view, it is extremely significant that intergovernmental institutions such as the Council of Ministers are now backed by technical institutions such as the Commission, and even by a body directly elected by citizens, such as the European Parliament. The principle of subsidiarity has allowed European institutions to intervene in selected policy areas of member countries. Seen from a global perspective, the European Union is an experiment of great importance.44 We can only hope that it will be imitated by other regional organizations, be it the Union of African Unity or the Organization of American States . At the same time, the European Union offers interesting cues for a possible reform of the United Nations and the setting up of new institutions.

It is certainly significant that an international example of cosmopolitan democracy such as the EU is undergoing a process of centralization which may, in the future, make it resemble more closely the federalist model. Today there is much discussion on the appropriateness of centralizing within European bodies the competences typical of sovereign states, such as monetary and defence policies. It is not my intention to discuss the prospects of the European Union,[45] but I would like to stress that, notwithstanding its prodigious capacity to integrate and expand geographically, it remains a substantially regional experience . And in so far as it has been joined by exclusively democratic governments, it is an organization of countries with homogeneous constitutions.

The United Nations

Unlike the European Union, the UNO has set no conditions on membership. It has accepted governments on the basis of their effective territorial control as opposed to their legitimacy. The UNO is thus the first intergovernmental organization which involves all the states of the world but which, until recently, was made up chiefly of non-democratic states. Although the UNO came into being as a confederation, from the beginning it has cultivated much broader ambitions. The approval of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ratified the principle that, even domestically, all member states should undertake to respect given norms. This principle was of course a formality and never put into practice, nor was the UNO to en force it. However, the Universal Declaration itself was a seed that was bound to grow.

Would it be possible today to reform the United Nations and make it the backbone of the cosmopolitan model? Some observers argue that the UNO as such cannot serve these purposes; that it is impossible to reform, given the prevailing interests of states and the excessive power of the permanent members of the Security Council.[46] I take the opposite view.

I believe it is unrealistic to look for more finely tuned vehicles to achieve a democratic world order, and that we must mobilize forces to reform the UNO democratically.

The cosmopolitan democracy model has many points in common with the proposals to reform the organization.[47] The main reform proposals are summed up in table 10.1.[48]

Table 10.1 Reform of the United Nations

Institution	*Present structure*	*Reform proposal*
General Assembly	Five delegates appointed by governments.	Delegates must represent both government and opposition. Direct election of one or two delegates.
Security Council	Five permanent members with power of veto and ten members elected by the General Assembly.	Limitation and, in the future, abolition of the power of veto. Opening to regional organizations such as the European Union. Consultative vote to representatives of civil society.
International Court of Justice	Optional acceptance of jurisdiction by states.	Compulsory jurisdiction as consequence of UNO membership.
Peacekeeping	On the mandate of the Security Council, the Secretary-General asks states to supply soldiers.	Military and civilian peace forces set up and trained by states in col!aboration with INGOs hut at the disposal of the Security Council.
Civil society	Thematic forums (on environment, population, development, etc.) in which governmental and nongovernmental organizations take part.	Elective parliamentary assembly with consultative powers.
Criminal jurisdiction	Special courts for situations of outstanding gravity with (former Yugoslavia, Rwanda).	lnternational criminal court with compulsory jurisdiction over crimes of genocide, aggression and violation of human rights.

The role of states

It is above all individual states which can begin to make cosmopolitan democracy materialize by adopting its principles in their domestic and foreign policies. States may unilaterally implement many of the norms suggested by this model without necessarily having to wait for a general consensus. There are a number of actions which' are already taken by states in order to reinforce the principles of democracy at the three levels mentioned above. Extending internal democracy, for example, also implies granting to foreigners certain political rights, including the right to vote, as many states or even local governments already do. Governments willing to reinforce interstate democracy may take unilateral decisions, including accepting unilaterally the jurisdiction of the World Court, banning the production of and trade in weapons, and promoting and participating in intergovernmental organizations. Governments can also provide a substantial contribution to democracy by providing resources, such as economic aid or peacekeeping forces, in areas of global concern.

The list of these prescriptions is much longer and is not unique to the project presented here. Andrew Linklater, for example, has already addressed the question of which states should be considered good citizens of the international society.[49] There are many specific actions which governments already take or could take to extend democracy within nations, among states and at the global level. Any state could be a microexample of cosmopolitan democracy.[50]

Civil society

This chapter has placed great emphasis on the involvement of citizens as agents of global change. This is based on the development of a nascent global civil society which is transforming the political landscape.[51] Citizens and their organizations can play a fundamental role at the three levels of democracy described here. Besides the perennial struggle to extend democracy in their own polity, civil societies can induce their governments to adopt policies conducive to peaceful and lawful interstate relations. They can also play a direct role in the management of global issues. Experiences of these types abound. This does not mean that there is a massive movement to extend democracy beyond the state level. On the contrary, it should be recognized that such a movement is small in the light of such ambitious goals. Still, there is sufficient evidence that citizens can play an important role in the process of democratizing the global society, as they have already done in the struggle to achieve democracy in their own communities.

CONCLUSIONS

'Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?' Alice asked the Cheshire Cat. 'That depends a good deal on where you want to get to,' came the reply. We should always remember this simple but illuminating lesson when we address the broader political problem of the world order. We know that one world order- the Cold War- has come to an end, and that we are now experiencing a phase of political and theoretical uncertainty in which those steering states must devise new rules for an as yet unfinished game, and academics must attempt new interpretations and propose new strategies.

The cosmopolitan democracy project points to a way out of the present uncertainty: the democratization of the international system as a political course parallel to the domestic democratization of states. Democracy has made great progress in recent years, but it is still a long way from outright victory. To be able to claim that, it must also assert itself in international relations. Today the conditions are more favourable than ever before.

States must, first of all, be ready and willing to form a society of societies. The typical forms of international organization, exemplified here in the confederal and federalist models, do not seem to meet the prerequisites of a democratic world order. It is thus necessary to design a system of states different from the existing one. This is the ambition of the cosmopolitan model.

The feasibility of this, as with any other political project, depends in the final analysis on the forces that are prepared to come out into the open and actively support it. The forces which oppose it are relatively easy to identify: they range from opponents of democracy to those who favour domestic democracy but who are sceptical about its extension to international affairs. It is, above all, the concept of world politics as the exclusive realm of states which is against any form of international integration based on cooperation and legality.

There are, however, strong tendencies in civil society towards a democratic world order. Forces which promoted democracy inside states to meet extremely tangible needs are now approaching the world framework with the awareness that domestic democracy on its own is incomplete. Although this awareness is still the preserve of relatively restricted circles, there are also historical trends which draw individuals towards a global society. This is by no means the first time that economic and social processes have moved faster than institutional innovations. Sooner or later, however, society always manages to create organs capable of serving its vital needs.

What is needed now is the participation of new political subjects. According to the cosmopolitan project, they should he world citizens, provided with the institutional channels

to take part and assume duties *vis-à-vis* the global destiny. If citizens had not been capable of assuming this responsibility directly, democracy would never have Enjoyed such great success in so many countries. It is no vain hope, therefore, to believe that in time the citizens of the world will take upon themselves the responsibility of managing this small planet of theirs democratically.

NOTES

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1 Cf. M. Kaldor, *The Imaginary War* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).
2 See D. Archibugi and D. Held (eds), *Cosmopolitan Democracy: an Agenda for a New World Order* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); D. Held, *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); R. Falk, *On Humane Governance*: *Toward a New Global Politics* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995).
3 According to G. Sartori, *Democrazia.* Cosa è (Milan: Rizzoli, 1994), there is a single model of democracy which can take different forms. Other scholars have convincingly shown that there are various theoretical models of democracy. See C. B. Macpherson, *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977); and D. Held, *Models of Democracy*, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996) and the classification of democratic countries proposed by A. Lijphart, *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Covernment in Twenty-One Countries* (London: Yale University Press, 1984).
4 See D. Beetham, 'Liberal democracy and the limits of democratization', in D. Held (ed.), *Prospests for Democracy* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), p. 55.
5 J. Dunn (ed.), *Democracy: the Unfinished Journey*, 508 BC to AD 1992 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
6 By democratic route I refer to the evolution of the political system. The concept is therefore different from Robert Dahl's notion of democratic process, which describes the formulation of decisions in a democratic society, see his *Democracy and its Critics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), ch. 8.
7 See the appraisal of the new democracies by J. Linz and A. Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe, South Africa, and the Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1 996).
8 I draw these data from the annual reports of Freedom House Survey Team, *Freedom in the World*: *Political Rights and Civil Liberties* 1995-96 (New York: Freedom House, 1996).

These data are controversial and it has been argued that some of these countries are just facade democracies. Still, it is undisputable that Western democracies have extended considerably.

9 S. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991) dates the beginning of the third wave of democratization to 1974, when the remaining fascist regimes in Europe were overthrown. Observed from the point of view of the world order, however, it would appear that the main change came with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.

10 M. W. Doyle, 'Kant, liberal legacies and foreign affairs', parts 1 and 2, *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 12.3 and 12.4 (I983), pp. 205-35, 323-54.

11 This is the thesis of Dahl, *Democracy and its Critics*, ch. 22, and Huntington, *The Third Wave*, ch. 6.

12 See S. Huntington, 'The West: unique, not universal', *Foreign Affairs*, 75.6 (1996), pp. 28-46.

13 These problems are dealt with in a vast and growing body of literature. For an overview of problems, see N. Bobbio, *ll futuro della democrazia* (Turin: Einaudi, 1984); Dahl, *Democracy and its Critics*; Held, *Prospests for Democracy*.

14 Kaldor, *The Imaginary War*, pp. 112ff.

15 The effect of globalization on democracy is at the heart of Held, *Democracy and the Global Order*; see also chapter 1 above. Cf. also Y. Sakamoto (ed.), *Global Transformation: Challenge to the State System* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1994).

16 For a discussion, see K. Goldmann, 'Democracy is incompatible with international politics', in K. Goldmann, S. Berglund and G. Sjostedt (eds), *Democracy and Foreign Policy* (Aldershot: Gower, 1986).

17 Where possible, the term 'nation' is used to define a political-ethnic community and the term 'state' an institutional structure with specific control over a given territory. The distinction is necessary since nation-states are *de facto* only a minority of states.

18 H. J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace*, abridged edn (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993), p. 6.

19 The 'control mechanisms' of world politics are defined and descrited by J. Rosenau, chapter 2 above, and the body of literature he cites. See also J. Rosenau and E.-O. Czempiel (eds), *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

20 D. Zolo, *Cosmopolis. La prospettiva del governo mondiale* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1995), p. 173, trans. as *Cosmopolis: Prospests for World Government* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997). For a discussion of the communitarian arguments, see Janna Thompson, 'Democratic communities', in J. Thompson *Justice and World Order* (I.ondoll: Koutledge, 1992), ch. 7, and chapter 9 above.

21 In dealing with specific institutions such as the Eurl)pean (ommunity and the United Nations, Bellamy and (`astiglionc, in chapter X alzove, and 1). Bienen, V. Rittberger and W. Wagner, in chapter 14 below, stress that international and supranational organizations should somehow accept and recognize the reasoning of communitarians.

22 N. Bobbio, 'Democracy and the international system', in Archibugi and Held, *Cosmopolitan Democracy*, pp. 17-18.
23 Although with some caution, this seems to be the thesis supported by B. Russett, 'A neo-Kantian perspective: democracy, interdependence, and international organizations in building security communities', in E. Adler and M. Barnett (eds), *Security Communities in Comparative and Historical Perspestive* (forthcoming), and N. P. Gleditsch, 'Democracy and the future of European peace', *European Journal of International Relations*, 1.4 (1995), pp. 539-71.
24 Bobbio, 'Democracy and the international system', p. 39.
25 'Incoherence' is defined as acts of foreign policy which do not conform to the nature of the domestic political system. Cf. L. Bonanate, 'Peace or democracy?' in Archibugi and Held, *Cosmopolitan Democracy*, p. 52.
26 D. P. Forsythe, 'Democracy, war, and covert action', *Journal of Peace Research*, 29.4 (1992), pp. 385-95, has documented the covert actions undertaken by the United States against elected governments in Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), Indonesia (1955), Brazil (1960s), Chile (1973) and Nicaragua (1980s).
27 Bobbio, 'Democracy and the international system', p. 18.
28 It is highly significant that the former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, stressed the organization's action precisely on these three levels: 'The United Nations must act to promote democracy not only within states and among states, but also within the global society in which we shall be living. These are three levels of the policy of democratization pursued by the UN.' From 'Secretary General reflects on global prospect for United Nations', address to annual meeting of the World Economic Forum, Davos, 24 Jan. 1995. Boutros-Ghali released *An Agenda for Democratization* (New York: United Nations, 1996) which was the complement to his previous and successful *An Agenda for Peace* (New York: United Nations, 1992) and *An Agenda for Development* (New York: United Nations,1994). Unfortunately, the latest Agenda was only published in December l996, when the General Assembly did not confirm his position. The document therefore received very little attention.
29 For a summing up of this evidence, see N. P. Gleditsch, 'Democracy in International Affairs', paper presented at the Transnational Democracy workshop, Cambridge, Mar. 1996.
30 Cf. T. Vanhanen, *The Process of Democratization: a Comparative Study of 147 States, 1980-88* (New York: Crane Russak, 1990).
31 See T. Franck, 'The emerging right to democratic governance', *American Journal of International Law*, 86.1 (1992), pp. 46-91. These issues are discussed at length by Crawford and Marks, chapter 4 above. See also Crawford, 'Democracy and international law', *British Year Book of International Law* (1993), pp. 113-33.
32 See Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Consolidation.*
33 'One state, one vote' does not necesarily imply that the votes of all states sh(?uld coullt as equal. It might be agreed that the votes of individual states are weighted by their size. But this is quite different from the notion that the members of a state might support different views. This issue is further discussed in Bienen, Rittberger and Wagner, chapter 14 below.

34 D. Mitrany, sThe functional approach to world organization', *International Affairs*, 24.3 (1948), pp. 350-63.
35 A classic account of the legal differences between confederations of states and federal states is provided in H. Kelsen, *The General Theory of Law and State* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945), section SD. An excellent theoretical and historical overview of state unions is found in M. Forsyth, *Unions of States*: *the Theory and Practice of Confederation* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1981). Cf. also the suggestive essays of M. Wight, Systems of States (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977).
36 H. Kochler, *Democracy and the International Rule of Law* (Vienna: Springer-Verlag, 1995), and Zolo, *Cosmopolis*, have argued that after the Gulf War, the world order took on the characteristics of a new Holy Alliance.
37 I demonstated in 'Models of international organizations in perpetual peace projects', *Review of International Studies*, 18 (1 992), pp. 295-3 1 7, that this was the fear of many democratic thinkers vis-à-2vis a league formed of sovereigns.
38 E.-O. Czempiel has defined governance as 'the capacity to get things done without the legal competence to command that they be done'; see 'Governance and democratization', in Rosenau and Czempiel, *Governance without Government*, p. 250. See also chapter 2 above.
39 I highlighted the Kantian derivation of the cosmopolitan democracy model in 'Immanuel Kant, cosmopolitan law and peace', *European Journal of International Relations*, 1.4 (1995), pp. 429-56.
40 M. Kaldor, Proposal to the Economic and Social Research Council for a seminar on Cosmopolitan Democracy', University of Sussex, Brighton, 1993.
41 Cf. in particular H. Kelsen, *Das Problem der Souvereanitaet und die Theorie des Voelkerrechts* (Tuebingen: Mohr, 1920).
42 For paradigmatic expositions of these two approaches see D. Mitrany, *The Functional Theory of Politics* (London: Martin Robertsons 1975) and N. Bobbio, *ll problema della guerra e le vie della pace* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1984).
43 This idea of sovereignty is compatible with T. Pogge's notion of 'vertical dispersal of sovereignty', see his 'Cosmopolitanism and sovereignty', in (`. Brown (ed.), *Political Restrusturing in Europe*: *Ethical Perspestives* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), pp. 103ff. See also A. Linklater, chapter ó above.
44 U. Preuss, chapter 7 above, and Bellamy and Castiglione, chapter 8 above, discuss at length the significance of the European experience for the cosmopolitan project.
45 Two possible scenarios for Europe, the first a traditional one based on the creation of a Eu ropean superstate, and another congruent t with the cosmopolitan model presented here, are outlined by M. Kaldor, 'Furopean institutions, nation-states and nationalism', in Archibugi and Held, *Cosmopolitan Democracy*, p. 86. Bellamy and Castiglione, chapter 8 above, review the current debate on the Furopean Union's future.
46 This is the thesis of, *inter alia*, Zolo, Cosmopolis.

47 I discussed the prospect of reforming the United Nations on the basis of the cosmopolitan project in 'From the United Nations to cosmopolitan democracy', in Archibugi and Held, *Cosmopolitan Democracy*, and *Il futuro delle Nazioni Unite* (Rome: Edizioni Lavoro, 1995). Similar proposals are discussed in Held, *Democracy and the Global Order*, pp. 278ff., and *Models of Democracy*, pp. 358-9, as the prescriptive part of his exposition and defence of the cosmopolitan democracy project. The most significant UN reform proposals are discussed in E. Childers and B. Urquhart, *Renewing the United Nations System* (Uppsala: Dag Hammarskjoeld Foundation, 1994); Commission for Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourbood* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations, *The United Nations in its Second Half-Century* (New York: Ford Foundation, 1995). Bruce Russett, 'Ten balances for weighing UN reform proposals', in 48 B. Russett (ed.), *The Once and Future Security Council* (New York: St. Martin's, 1997), discusses the pros and cons of these proposals.
Bienen, Rittberger and Wagner, chapter 14 below, and Falk, chapter 15 below, address the implications of some UN reform proposals for political theory.
49 A. Linklater, 'What is a good international citizen?' in P. Keal (ed.), *Ethics and Foreign Policy*-(St Leonards, New South Wales: Allen and Unwin, 1992).
50 J. Thompson, 'Cultural rights and political obligationl, paper, La Trobe University, Bundoora, 1995.
51 M. Koehler, in chapter 11 below, considers the role of civil society in global change. A specific case study of the impact of transnational activities is also provided below by G. Prins and E. Sellwood, see chapter 12 below.