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Citizenship and Cosmopolitan Democracy

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Cosmopolitanism and international integration

The cosmopolitan ideal is so old, and so unaccomplished, that it cannot be assessed against contingent political events. But precisely because cosmopolitanism has such a long history, it is worth admitting that, at the dawn of the XXI century, its enemies appear stronger than ever. Xenophobic and racist parties are increasing their consensus in almost all European countries and also outside Europe. The most palpable enemy of cosmopolitanism – namely nationalism – is becoming more and more powerful.

It is true that several of the cosmopolitan aspirations have never been fulfilled and often not even addressed in the dominant political setting. But the Second World War clearly indicated that nationalism could easily lead to violence, war and catastrophes. The WWII winners partially tried to prevent future scourges increasing international integration, undersigning several treaties and covenants. This led to the creation of the United Nations and to the making and reinforcement of many other international organizations. International integration is not necessarily a synonym of cosmopolitanism, but in principle it paves the way to more advanced forms of amalgamation that do not limit themselves to governmental diplomacy, but also allow citizens to become active players of a global community.

The first four decades of the post-WWII period have not been those of institutional cosmopolitanism, but rather the age of the Cold War. The international organization was somehow functional to regulate the East-West rivalry, on some occasions with success, other with failures. Inside each of the blocks there were strong nationalistic feelings but, at the same time, both of them had also an international soul, in the form of "Third World emancipation" in the Soviet bloc

or of "political and economic liberalism" in the Western side. When the Cold War ended, there were strong hopes that the decent internationalist spirit of each block could prevail and lead to a new season of world politics. A season which could genuinely be inspired by cosmopolitanism.

Since the 1990s, proposals for disarmament, new human rights regimes, economic cooperation, monetary unions and world parliaments flourished. Among them, many policy-makers, policy-advisers and pundits also attempted to expand globally some the values and norms of democracy. Cosmopolitan democracy is one of the several ideas blossomed in this season (Archibugi and Held, 1995). Unfortunately, a fundamental historical occasion was lost and not much has been achieved to reform the world order. However, we have not to forget that the post 1989 era also led to fundamental changes in world affairs.

International trade, foreign direct investment, migration and tourism, just to name a few areas for which quantitative indicators are available, have steadily grown and not even the 2008 economic crisis has managed to dramatically revert the long-term trends. States have tried to match economic and social globalization by increasing their cooperation and international organizations have become bigger and more influential. The European Union expanded to the East, and several European countries gave up their monetary sovereignty creating the Euro, the most important post-national currency. Other regional organizations started to flourish in Asia, Latin America, North America and Africa. Trade began to be regulated by an international organization such as the new-born World Trade Organization. International crimes, that were for so long left unaccountable, began to be investigated and prosecuted by a new generation of international tribunals, including the International Criminal Court. In other words, some steps were taken, and even if highly insufficient, there were at least some attempts to match through global governance the pace of financial, economic and social globalization.

But if we look at the most recent years, it seems that a U-turn has occurred in world politics. Brexit, the outcome of almost all referendums on the European Union, the election of a nationalistic President in the United States, the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, do indicate that something is changing. Has the triumphal march of economic and social globalization, chased with difficulty by institutions, came today to a halt? It is not just the access to government of anti-global and, even more, anti-cosmopolitan forces; change in governments and even the rise of new parties and movements belongs to the physiology of politics and, even more, of democracies. But apparently today a counter-tendency is occurring:

international commitments are not any longer increasing, but they are in a steady state or can even be reduced. Some commentators have even wondered if this is the end of the liberal international order (Ikenberry, 2018). To find an historical analogy we need to go back many decades, namely to the dark 1930s, and we are even afraid to remember that Germany withdrew from the League of Nations in 1933 and Soviet Union was expelled in 1939. These cases sadly remind us that when international cooperation is reversed, it could be the awaiting of tragedies and devastations.

Hopefully, the season of global disintegration will be short and will not lead to the disasters experienced in the past. The trends towards social, economic and cultural globalization are strong and it is unlikely that they can be reversed by political decisions. Nonetheless, we have to take the current nationalistic reaction as a serious signal and understand its origin: globalization has distributed its fruits very unevenly with a few winners and too many losers (Milanovic, 2016). This has generated resentments that have already exploded in anti-politics. Nationalistic or even xenophobic sentiments are often the wrong reaction towards tendencies that are not properly addressed by dominant political powers. Too many people felt lost in a global arena which gave no hope to become also a global society.

For this reason, it is crucial to clearly outline the basic difference between *globalization*, led by uncontrolled social and economic forces, and *cosmopolitanism*, which implies an active political participation of individuals to world politics. Globalization it has too often not respected local heritages, the working of local businesses, the well-being of specific communities, leading to brutal reorganizations of economic and social life which were not any longer controlled by citizens. The underdogs where left unanswered; they could lose their job or seeing their communities depopulated without even knowing where to address their protests. Cosmopolitanism, on the contrary, is an attempt to empower individuals also in global affairs, allowing them to participate in choices affecting their lives and preventing them to be passively affected by decisions taken elsewhere (Cicchelli and Octobre, 2018). Cosmopolitan democracy, in particular, has since the beginning been an attempt to specify the forms according to which citizens could effectively participate in world politics.

In the new international landscape, cosmopolitan democracy can hopefully be an intellectual impetus to resist the current nationalistic drift, suggesting forms of accountable global governance on the one hand, and inclusive methods of domestic political participation on the other hand.

The origin and sources of cosmopolitan democracy

Cosmopolitan democracy is a project of normative political theory that attempts to apply some of the principles, values and procedures of democracy to global politics. Born in the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall (Archibugi and Held, 1995), it was developed by scholars that had already worked on democratic theory and practices, such as David Held (1995), thinkers that actively participated to the East-West dialogue in the 1980s, such as Mary Kaldor (1999) and myself (Archibugi, 2008), and human rights and anti-war legal theorists such as Richard Falk (2008). From the very beginning, cosmopolitan democracy was not an intellectual exercise only, but an attempt to link some theoretical arguments to social and political activism. Not surprisingly, many civil society organizations and peace movements have also supported the idea of cosmopolitan democracy and contributed to its shaping.

Cosmopolitan democracy can be seen as a revival and the development of ancient peace projects. In particular, it is an attempt to refine and apply in the current political landscape some of the insights of institutional pacifism. An international system dominated by wars and/or by the fear of war is often the best companion to allow tyranny within nations. External threats are traditionally used by authoritarian states to justify repression, human rights violations and lack of accountability. A peaceful international system is often the ideal environment to expand participation, to enforce human rights and to keep rulers accountable.

Peace can be achieved through a variety of methods and one of them is strengthening international norms, covenants and organizations. Several peace projects of the past, including those of William Penn, the Abbé of Saint-Pierre, Jeremy Bentham, Immanuel Kant, and Claude-Henri de Saint-Simon, already envisaged international organizations with the function to sort out conflicts through peaceful means rather than through war. This body of thought had a crucial role in the creation of modern international organizations, including the League of Nations, the United Nations and the European Union. Developing this noble tradition, cosmopolitan democracy has also tried to explore how existing international organizations could increase their powers and where new ones are needed.

To become more authoritative, international organizations should try to apply several principles, values and procedures of democracy. Rule of law, transparency, accountability and participation should be the guiding principles of reformed international organizations. This, in turn, requires that international organizations should be more than just inter-governmental

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associations, giving voice and political representation also to other players of each political community. So far, international organizations have been mostly inter-governmental and they have not managed to satisfactorily guarantee participation to minorities, opposition political parties, trade unions and nongovernmental organizations.

Cosmopolitan democracy does not aim to substitute existing states with a world political power. It is therefore different from several world federalist projects, even if it has acquired considerable inputs from this noble tradition (Marchetti, 2008). Rather than being an attempt to concentrate force in a single source, it aims to subjugate coercive powers by developing more advanced constitutional rules.

But there is also an internal component of cosmopolitan democracy that needs to be further developed: each modern political community is heterogeneous and it has to accommodate individuals with different values, heritage, faith and language. Through migrations, tourism and business exchanges, our political communities have become more and more diverse, and often this is an asset to increase well-being and to enrich cultures. Still, most states have not yet been able to respond positively to these historical transformations. Cosmopolitan democracy is therefore also an attempt to develop national democratic systems with the aim to minimize political exclusion and to increase participation.

The global dimension of cosmopolitan democracy

Since the 1990s, democratic regimes have spread across the East and the South. For the first time in history, elected governments administer the majority of the world's population (Marshall and Elzinga-Marshall, 2017). Although not all of these regimes are equally respectful of basic human rights, there is significant pressure to achieve representative, accountable and lawful administration. Democracy has become, both in theory and in practice, the principal source of legitimate authority and power. How come that not even democratic forces have seriously tried to reach a process of democratization in international institutions?

Cosmopolitan democracy is based on the empirical observation that, while states are legally sovereign, they are in practice non-autonomous. Environmental threats, contagious diseases, trade, terrorism and migration make it more and more difficult for states to be truly independent. Each political community has to cope with phenomena that take place outside its territorial jurisdiction

and for which it has no direct accountability and control (for a discussion, see Koenig-Archibugi, 2018). In these circumstances is becoming increasingly difficult to preserve meaningful democratic decision-making within states. If the democratic principle of involvement and equality of all members affected by decision-making is to be preserved, the participation of individual states to world politics need to be re-considered.

It is certainly true that contemporary world is composed of highly heterogeneous regimes. In spite of the democratic wave of the last quarter of a century, too many nations are still under authoritarian governments. Moreover, the quality of democracy is very different across nations as diverse as, say, Sweden and Mongolia. Democratic regimes could be unwilling of creating political bonds with countries that have authoritarian rule or that have rather rudimentary democratic institutions. Even in the case of the European Union, composed by nations that already satisfy a threshold of democratic level, it is often difficult to engage in greater integration because of the internal differences in political practices. These objective difficulties should generate fresh energies able to improve the practices of internal regimes as well as the procedures of international organizations. With the explicit aim to increase the quantity and the quality of democracy within each state as well as the responsiveness of international organizations to the problems of its members.

For long, it has been explicitly and more often implicitly assumed that liberal and democratic states are less likely to commit international crimes and to be involved in aggressive wars. In other words, many of those that consider liberal democracy a desirable internal regime, also implied that they were honourable members of the international community. Cosmopolitan democracy challenges the view that the foreign policy of democratic states is more virtuous than that of non-democratic states. Even the most democratic states can be aggressive, selfish, and prepared to defend their vital interests by all means. History provides large abundance of aggression wars perpetuated by democratic regimes as well as by despotic ones.

The hypothesis according to which "democracies do not fight each other" (the so-called democratic peace) is widely debated in international relations (Russett, 1994). According to this hypothesis, even if democracies are often war-prone, there have never been wars among consolidated democracies. Not everybody agrees with this fact, but those that do agree also claim that if all states of the world were democratic, war may disappear. The normative implication is that to achieve the goal of peace it is necessary to promote muscularly internal democratization.

Some policy-makers, such as George W. Bush, misunderstood the implications of this hypothesis and went so far to wage war against despotic regimes with the aim to force a regime change and to induce these countries to become democratic.

Cosmopolitan democracy has an opposite view: although it shares the desire to increase both the quantity of democratic states and the quality of their democratic procedures, it does not assume that the goal of peace can be achieved through regime change obtained by military invasions. Moreover, it argues that "exporting" democracy through war is contradicting the very nature of the democratic process since this requires to be built from below and not from above. For these reasons, cosmopolitan democracy suggests that an international system based on cooperation and dialogue is a fundamental condition to foster democratic progresses inside individual countries and also to allow peoples living under dictatorship to change endogenously their own regime. While the "peace among democracies" hypothesis tends to stress the causal link from internal democracy -» to international peace, cosmopolitan democracy points out at an equally important link: from international peace and cooperation -» to internal democracy (Archibugi and Cellini, 2017).

A more active and participative international organization can, in fact, have a fundamental effect in helping individual nations to move towards democratic regimes and to consolidate the existing ones. The case of the European Union is certainly instructive: it managed to facilitate democratic transition in Southern Europe in the 1980s and in Eastern Europe in the 1990s. In both occasions, it gave to new and young democratic nations the same rights and dignity than those of established member states. Can similar strategies be attempted at the United Nations and in other regional organizations? This depends very much on the incentives that the most powerful and affluent members of these international organizations, in particular Western democracies, can commit to foster democratic transition and consolidation. If democratic nations are really willing to extend democratic regimes world-wide, they would better increase the resources devoted to cooperation and integration policies.

There have been authoritative attempts to apply democracy also to the international arena, including those of two Secretary-Generals of the United Nations (Boutros-Ghali, 1996; Annan, 2002) and a Director-General of the World Trade Organization (Lamy, 2005). Unfortunately, these suggestions have not been further implemented. As a consequence, international organizations

continue to represent mostly governments, and core issues concerning war and security are still in the hands of national governments that, as in the past, can take decisions autonomously.

Cosmopolitan democracy is therefore engaged in several ways with the democratization of international organizations. In particular, it actively participated to campaigns for the creation of a Parliamentary Assembly within the United Nations (Leinen and Bummel, 2018), to limit the veto power within the UN Security Council, to enlarge the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, to strengthen the power and functions of judicial institutions such as the International Court of Justice, to strengthen the international human rights regime (for an analysis of several international organizations, see Levi et al., 2014; for a UN centred view, see Archibugi, 2008, chapter 6).

Democratic practice in a globalising planet

But the scope of cosmopolitan democracy is not limited to the realm of international relations. Each political community has to deal with a certain degree of heterogeneity: this applies for multi-language or multi-faith communities, for areas thrown by conflicts and civil wars, for self-determination claims. Democratic theory and practice has for long tried to address these problems (for an overview, see Held, 2006). In particular, to activate the procedures of democracy, each political community needs to pre-define its members and, in most cases, also its boundaries: which are the citizens that are entitled to participate to decision-making and that could be appointed as decision-makers? But when we have "overlapping communities of faith" (Held, 1995), rigid constituencies might be the wrong answer.

Democracy has progressively increased the number of participants, but in order to do that, it also had to make painful exclusions and arbitrary definitions of borders and boundaries. These exclusions are often highly controversial and might even transform a sophisticated democratic polity into a xenophobic community (see Mann, 2005). Democracies have still to learn properly on how to deal with outsiders such as migrants, ethnic minorities, native populations or refugees. This is a conundrum that has accompanied democratic theory and practice since its beginning: on the one hand, there is the assumption that some core democratic exercises, including participation, equality and accountability, work better in culturally and linguistically homogeneous communities. On the other hand, the democratic principle according to which all those affected by

decision-making should not just be rule-takers but also rule-makers, implies that the boundaries of the political community need to be continuously re-drawn. There is therefore an implicit tension between the "*kratos*" of the "*demos*" on the one hand, and the "*polis*" of the "*cosmos*" on the other hand. Can this tension be reconciled?

States have, so far, been the main institutions able to decide how political communities should be defined and limited. This has also allowed to develop democracy itself. It is a fact that, so far, democracy has managed to flourish within states: we do not have (yet?) examples of sophisticated democratic systems working outside well-defined states. In order to achieve self-governments, states also promoted a certain "homogeneity" within the community, reinforcing common identity, language, values, shared history and tradition. Democratic states have also done something more, namely have attempted to guarantee that all their citizens, including minorities, could enjoy equal political and civil rights.

But to be able to respond adequately to the challenges of increasing multi-cultural and inter-dependent communities, some basic principles of democratic practice and organization should be revisited. Until now democracy has been developed in relation to territorially delimited communities. In this situation the individual belongs to community A or to community B, but not to both, and therefore can participate in the democratic process of either A or B, but not both. Is it possible to re-imagine the boundaries of political communities in order to make them inclusive towards the "others"? The others can be aliens such as migrants or refugees living or seeking to live in an established political community. But they might also simply be citizens living in community B that are directly affected by facts or decisions taken in a community A.

Unfortunately, democratic states are not yet prepared to deal with the preferences and needs of individuals of other political communities as they deal with those of their own citizens. Something more is needed to safeguard the basic democratic principles of equality and participation, namely the willingness of states to undertake agreements that enshrine procedures of democracy among and across states. These agreements do not solely involve states, as in the case of international organizations discussed above, but could involve local governments, epistemic communities or focus groups willing to create appropriate forms of consultation or decision-making across borders or for considering collective claims.

There are more and more political communities that are not any longer territorially-based. For the first time it has become possible to generate virtual communities among citizens that share

similar problems across the world, for example because they heavily rely to cure their disease on a common therapy, they share the same faith, they speak an endangered language, they belong to an ethnic group scattered across different states, or simply share the same hobby (Gould, 2014). New information and communication technologies are opening the gates to a genuine global public sphere, and it has become technically feasible for communities living in remote parts of the world to take part in the same deliberative process, either for specific or general purposes. Such deliberations are already happening in elite circles such as professional associations. But they can also involve the global demos as a whole, especially when issues that affect the destiny of all humanity (such as environmental and security issues) are at stake. These are typical case in which their members will need to be both citizens of a state *and* citizens of the world.

In many cases, communities involved in specific issues could be self-organizing. More often, and even when there is the willingness of stakeholders to participate, some forms of international organizations are needed, as in the case of the International Commission for the Protection of Lake Constance. Indigenous people still need to be protected vis-à-vis the state they belong from international covenants. Refugees are still in need of international protection since so many states are reluctant to implement international covenants (Benhabib, 2004). The distinctive aspect of cosmopolitan democracy, and which complements many valuable initiatives to protect human rights, is that it insists in considering individuals not only as rights-holders, but also as potential participants to the decision-making process.

Cosmopolitan democracy as an alternative to nationalism

The democratic wave started in 1989 gave to the people in the East and in the South the hope that a new season of human rights and prosperity would be coming and, in turn, that global affairs could be managed through cooperation. Since then, economic and social globalization has continuously progressed. It cannot be simply judged as "good" or "bad" since it obviously includes both positive and negative aspects. But something can be said: it has been a typical case in which the economic base has proceeded at a certain speed, while the institutional superstructure had serious difficulties to keep the same pace. Global governance has been mapped (Koenig-Archibugi, 2002), scrutinized (Zürn, 2018) and invoked, but so far it has not managed to deliver what citizens in many parts of the world expected. And certainly the global governance actually applied has not been inspired by the democratic principles preached by liberalism: more powerful

groups, lobbies and stronger states have managed to get the lion's share, living marginal groups and peripheral locations abandoned.

The predictable outcome has been that large part of the discarded populations searched protection reinforcing their identities. This explains why nationalistic and even xenophobic political parties and groups have managed to increase their consensus in spite of the fact that communications, media, tourism, foreign direct investment are more and more global in our age. While the current so-called populist is an explicable reaction, it is not able to deliver any meaningful outcome. Migrations, Internet and trade, just to mention a few, can be stopped or reduced by states alone at costs that are so high that will jeopardize long-term prosperity.

Cosmopolitan democracy offers an alternative: it is an attempt to subjugate globalization to democratic control, recognizing to individuals not only the passive role of "workers", "consumers" or simply "dispossessed". It aims to give to individuals the dignity of being citizens of the world, namely active participants of the community where they live. This should imply a minimal list of rights and duties that the existing political institutions, including international organizations, states and local authorities, should guarantee and expand (Cabrera, 2006). It is often argued that there are not political subjects willing to fight for a cosmopolitan democracy, but this is inaccurate. The interests and the political actions carried out to prevent an uncontrolled globalization are larger than it is generally expected (Archibugi and Held, 2011). Besides many and valuable actions that are everyday taken, there is also the need to have an overall frame of the world community that we would like to achieve. Cosmopolitan democracy is just an ambitious attempt to contribute to this frame.

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